

REMARKS

I. GENERAL

Claims 1-29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Subramaniam*, U.S. Publication No. US 2007/0118504 (hereinafter “*Subramaniam*”) in view of *Bartz et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 7,080,327 (hereinafter “*Bartz*”).

II. ARGUMENT

Section 103(a) provides that a patent may not be obtained “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). The factual determinations underpinning the legal conclusion of obviousness include (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art. *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.*, 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1729-30 (2007). To establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, the prior art references when combined must teach or suggest all the claim limitations. See *id*; *Dystar Textile GmbH & Co. v. C.H. Patrick*, 464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir 2006). The proposed combination of *Subramaniam* and *Bartz* does not teach or suggest all the limitations of claims 1-29 of the present application.

Independent Claims

Claim 1 recites, in part, “a managed application display area that displays a managed application responsive to the icon identifying the managed application being selected wherein the icon is selected according to a step in an automated workflow.” The proposed combination of *Subramaniam* and *Bartz* does not disclose a graphical user interface in which an icon is selected according to a step in an automated workflow. As discussed in Applicant’s “Amendment in Response to Non-Final Office Action,” *Subramaniam* does not disclose a graphical user interface, wherein the icons are selected according to a step in an automated workflow.” The Examiner argues that *Bartz* discloses the aforementioned limitation of claim 1. Final Action, pg. 4.

Bartz discloses a GUI that comprises a plurality of “graphic elements,” which “are icons rendered as buttons.” *Bartz* 7:65-67, 8:1-2. According to *Bartz* the graphic elements (icons) are either “activated” or “deactivated.” The terms activate and deactivate are not synonymous with selecting. Rather, the terms refer to a user’s ability to select a graphic element. *See Bartz* 8:13-14 (“An active element, when selected by a user, will initiate an action. An inactive element will not initiate an action if selected by a user.”). In *Bartz*, a task is not initiated in response to an icon being activated or deactivated. Rather, *Bartz* discloses a system in which tasks are initiated in response to a user *selecting* a particular icon. *Bartz* expressly states that “[e]lements are selected by a user,” and “user selection of an active element initiates a particular task.” *Bartz* 8:26, 8:35-36. *Bartz* does not, therefore, teach or suggest the claimed “wherein the icon is selected according to a step in an automated workflow.” The Examiner has failed to make a *prima facie* case of obviousness for claim 1 because the proposed combination of *Subramaniam* and *Bartz* does not teach or suggest every limitation of claim 1.

Claims 8, 14, and 21 are non-obvious for the same reason. Claim 8 recites, in part, “wherein at least one of the icons is selected according to the corresponding step of the automated workflow,” and claim 14 recites “wherein one of the one or more icons is selected according to the corresponding step of the automated workflow.” Claim 21 recites “wherein one of the one or more icons is selected according to the corresponding step of the automated workflow and the type of call indicated by the contact center control panel.” The combination of *Subramaniam* and *Bartz* also fails to teach or suggest the portion of claim 26 that recites “automatically opening one or more applications on the agent’s desktop.” As discussed above, neither *Subramaniam* nor *Bartz* discloses selecting an icon according to a step in an automated workflow.

Dependent Claims

Dependent claims 2-7, 9-13, 15-20, 22-25, and 27-29 are allowable at least because of their dependence from claims 1, 8, 14, 21, and 26. The dependent claims also claim subject that is non-obvious in view of *Subramaniam* and *Bartz*. For example, claim 3 recites, in part, “a quick start bar, wherein the quick start bar includes one or more icons for identifying non-

managed applications.” The Examiner admits that *Subramaniam* does not disclose this feature of claim 3. *See* Final Action, pg. 5 (“*Subramaniam* does not specifically teach wherein the quick start bar includes one or more icons for identifying non-managed application.”). But the Examiner argues that claim 3 would have been obvious in view of *Subramaniam* and *Bartz*. Final Action, pg. 5. The Examiner has provided no support for this argument. The rejection of record fails to distinguish between the “task bar” and “quick start” bar of claim 10. Further, *Bartz* does not disclose that the graphic elements in Figure 4A identify non-managed applications. *Bartz*, therefore, does not teach or suggest the claimed “quick start bar, wherein the quick start bar includes one or more icons for identifying non-managed applications.” Claims 10 and 14 recite similar limitations and are non-obvious in view of *Subramaniam* and *Bartz* for the same reasons.

III. CONCLUSION

In view of the above, Applicant believes the pending application is in condition for allowance. Applicant believes no fee is due with this response. However, if a fee is due, please charge our Deposit Account No. 06-2380, under Order No. 47524/P157US/10613152 from which the undersigned is authorized to draw.

If an extension of time is required to enable this document to be timely filed and there is no separate Petition for Extension of Time filed herewith, this document is to be construed as also constituting a Petition for Extension of Time Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) for a period of time sufficient to enable this document to be timely filed. Any other fee required for such Petition for Extension of Time and any other fee required by this document pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.16 and 1.17, other than the issue fee, and not submitted herewith should be charged to Deposit Account No. 06-2380, under Order No. 47524/P157US/10613152 from

which the undersigned is authorized to draw. Any refund should be credited to the same Deposit Account.

Dated: August 11, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

By Ross Viguet
R. Ross Viguet
Registration No.: 42,203
FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P.
2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2800
Dallas, Texas 75201-2784
(214) 855-8185
(214) 855-8200
Attorney for Applicant

Amendment After Final Action Under 37 C.F.R. 1.116

I hereby certify that this paper (along with any paper referred to as being attached or enclosed) is being transmitted via the Office electronic filing system in accordance with § 1.6(a)(4).

Dated: August 11, 2008 Signature: 
(Linda L. Gibson)